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CURING THE "EVERY-OTHER-WEEKEND SYNDROME":
WHY VISITATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATE
AND APART FROM CUSTODY
I. INTRODUCTION
Divorce affects hundreds of thousands of families.1 In response
to these divorces, state statutes determine the relationships that a
large number of children have with a noncustodial parent. Even in
those cases where, either through mediation or negotiation, the
parents agree upon the relationships the children will have with
each parent, social perceptions of what is appropriate and what the
court will order should the parents fail to reach an agreement, drive
the parents' perceptions of their respective bargaining positions in
a custody contest.2 The courts for custody and visitation matters,
therefore, have tremendous effects on the relationships these
children will have with their noncustodial parents.
Unfortunately, legislatures and courts have placed less
emphasis on the relationship between the children and their
noncustodial parents than on the determination of with whom the
children should reside. When the state statutes use the same
guidelines and standards for both "primary physical custody" and
"visitation," the potential exists that the determination of "primary
physical custody" will dominate the "custody" process, thereby
ignoring the determination of "visitation."3 This problem is present
to an even greater extent in jurisdictions where courts determine
visitation without any statutory guidance.4
This Note explains why visitation needs a determination
process similar to, yet separate from, primary physical custody.
This Note focuses on the child's need for and the child's right to a
relationship with both parents. It analyzes the needs of children of
divorced parents, the current law regarding custody and visitation,
and the reasons why the current state of the law does not meet
those needs. Finally, this Note proposes and discusses a new
visitation standard.
1. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 1 (1992).
2. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 154-75 and accompanying text (discussing states' statutory treatment
of visitation and custody).
4. See id.
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There are several issues that this Note does not attempt to
resolve, including an analysis of custody determination standards
and guidelines. In addition, this Note does not discuss reasonswhy
visitation should be limited, supervised, or denied, because of
circumstances such as abuse; nor will it discuss the modification of
custody orders. This Note solely addresses visitation determina-
tions between the child and the parents when both parents are fit;
it does not address third party visitation, such as grandparent or
stepparent visitation. Finally, this Note does not address the issues
of gender-based decisions regarding custody and visitation because
statistics pertaining to which gender receives custody more
frequently are subject to the manipulation of the person or group
commissioning the study and are misinterpreted too easily.5
Some terms used in this Note need defining at the outset
because state statutes and court decisions vary in their use of
terminology. For the purposes of this Note, the term "visitation"
will refer to the time the child and noncustodial parent spend
together, regardless of whether the custodial parent has sole or
joint custody of the child. Despite the negative overtones that arise
from referring to any time the child and noncustodial parent spend
together as a mere "visit,"6 visitation is used instead of the terms
"parenting time" or "access time" solely because of society's instant
recognition and the courts' and statutes' widespread usage. Like-
wise, "custody" will be used to refer to "primary physical custody,"
which is the primary physical placement of the child with whom-
ever is determined to be the custodial parent.' "Custody" and
5. See generally Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody,
and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891 (1998) (discussing the effects
of gender stereotypes in custody battles).
6. See Matter of Tate, 797 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "[in its
generally accepted and utilized meaning, visitation implies a brief custody by the visiting
relative."); Heard v. Bell, 434 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App. 1968) ("[]nless definitely specified
in the court's finding, visitation means that one parent may visit children who are in the
custody of the other parent."); see also STEVEN H. GIFIs, BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL
TERMS 529 (3d ed. 1998) (defining visitation as "the right granted by a court to a parent or
other relative who is deprived custody of a child to visit the child on a regular basis.").
7. See Lerner v. Superior Court for San Mateo County, 242 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1952)
("The essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right to make decisions
regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion."); McFadden v. McFadden,
292 P.2d 795, 799 (Or. 1956).
Custody... connotes, among other things, the right of the legal custodian to
establish the legal domicile for the child, whereas such right does not abide with
the parent who enjoys only the occasional right of visitation, i.e., the right to
visit the child wherever it is, at certain time, or to have the child visit the
parent for stipulated periods.
Id. (citing Allen v. Allen, 268 P.2d 358, 361 (Or. 1954)); see also J.M.S. v. H.A., 242 S.E.2d
696, 697 (W. Va. 1978) (relating "Custody" of a child to "care and keeping," while connoting
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"visitation" are the two halves of "Custody;" therefore, the terms
shall be used here to avoid confusion.
II. THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE
As a result of the disruption of their families, children of
divorce face circumstances that are not always found with intact
families. This section discusses the stresses divorce can place on
children, the potential effects of those stresses, various coping
techniques children develop in response to the stresses, and the
benefits of maintaining the child's relationship with both parents.
Many different causes for divorce exist. In addition to the
stress over the actual or perceived causes of the marital breakdown,
the impending family dissolution causes a tremendous amount of
stress for family members.8 People experience this stress in the
forms of distress, depression, loneliness, regret, lack of control,
anger, verbal fighting, shortened tempers, and even physical
violence.9 This stress can occur during several different time
periods: before the divorce; during the actual divorce proceedings,
including custody/visitation determinations; and after the divorce,
if the parents do not maintain the semblance of an amicable
relationship."° Divorce is not a point in time; it can be an extended
process lasting over months or even years, thereby continuing the
stresses in each party's life.'1
'visitation" as an "act or an instance of visiting," and noting that "custody confers more
authority and power upon one in whom it is placed than does the privilege of visiting.");
GIFIS, supra note 6, at 116 (describing custody as "[tihe care and control of minor children
awarded by the court to one parent in a divorce proceeding.").
8. See generally MICHAEL R. STEVENSON & KATHRYN N. BLACK, How DIVORCE AFFECTS
OFFSPRING: A RESEARCH APPROACH (1996) (detailing the effects of divorce on children);
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1991);
Michael E. Lamb et al., The Effects of Divorce and Custody Arrangements on Children's
Behavior, Development, and Adjustment, 35 FAM. CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393 (1997)
(discussing the ways divorce and custody arrangements affect children).
9. See Lamb, supra note 8, at 394.
10. See Cynthia R. Pfeffer, Developmental Issues Among Children of Separation and
Divorce, in CHILDREN OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE: MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT 23
(Irving R. Stuart & Lawrence E. Abt eds., 1981). See generally NEIL KALTER, GROWING UP
WITH DIVORCE: HELPING YOUR CHILD AVOID IMMEDIATE AND LATER EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS
(1990) (discussing the divorce experience for children and offering coping strategies).
11. See MELINDA BLAU, FAMILIES APART: TEN KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL CO-PARENTING 35
(1993).
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A. Stresses of Divorce on Children
While divorce causes stress for all family members, the children
face special concerns. 2 Children are still developing their emo-
tional maturity, cognitive skills, and social skills. 3 Generally, they
do not have the ability to comprehend and mentally digest what is
happening around them; the only thing they know is that either
mommy or daddy is not going to live with them anymore.
14
Divorce can cause several types of stresses in children,
including economic concerns, threats to the parent-child relation-
ship, and potential negative effects from the parent-parent
relationship. Generally, parents with custody experience a drop in
their standard of living.'5 While economic matters might not be of
the greatest concern to younger children for whom the parents
provide care, the decreased standard of living that generally
accompanies divorce can have effects that are indirectly perceived
by children, such as the parents fighting over the amount of support
that a parent has paid.' 6 The child may subsequently view her
relationship with either or both parents as being threatened.'"
While this stress may be diminished once a court determines
custody, the child feels anxiety until the court settles the matter,
and she continues to feel anxiety over the relationship with the
noncustodial parent. 8
The interparental relationship is not always positive in
divorces either. Unfortunately, parental conflict throughout divorce
is a consistent predictor of maladjustment among children."
Because children become sensitive to the relationship between their
parents, they easily perceive negativity and outright hostility
12. See generally Pfeffer, supra note 10, at 20-33 (discussing the effects of divorce on
children's developmental processes); STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8 (evaluating the
effects of divorce on children).
13. See generally STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 59-126 (addressing the specific
types of problems experienced by children of divorce).
14. See BLAU, supra note 11, at 108 (describing the level of comprehension of children in
a divorcing family).
15. See STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 33; MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at
127.
16. See STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 33.
17. See Lamb, supra note 8, at 395.
18. See Pfeffer, supra note 10, at 30; Lamb, supra note 8, at 395-96. See generally W.
Glenn Clingempeel & N. Dickson Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and
Goals for Research, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 102 (1982) (discussing the major issues involved in
joint custody and its effects on children).
19. See ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION 217 (1994).
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between parents, thereby causing fear and anxiety in the children.2"
This stress may even create a desire by the child to halt a relation-
ship with the noncustodial parent, in order to avoid potential
conflict when the parents are together.2'
B. Effects of Stresses of Divorce on Children
The experiences of children during divorce vary widely, and
children may react uniquely to identical experiences.22 Potentially,
these stresses may have several effects on children. First, the
separation of the child from at least one parent can cause a period
of grieving similar to the death of the parent.23 This grief occurs for
several reasons. Primarily, the time spent between the parent and
the child will be less than before the parents divorced. In addition,
the home environment will be highly stressful due to the reordering
and restructuring which accompanies the departure of one parent.24
Finally, the child may feel responsible and subsequently experience
guilt or a sense of abandonment. 25 However, this grieving experi-
ence is not exactly the same as grief experienced because of a death,
and the effects may be ameliorated.26 The parents may plan,
discuss, and work through the family breakup, potentially including
the child as well.27 Each parent also has the possibility of maintain-
ing involvement with the child.28 While society generally condemns
divorce, divorce may actually diffuse a negative or malevolent
family environment, thus being healthier for the child than having
the parents stay together.29
Second, the varying degrees of conflict resolution may or may
not subject the child to continual stress.30 Some parents are able to
behave amicably toward each other in front of the child, either
because they are "faking it" or because they actually are able to
20. See JAMES A. TWAITE ET AL., CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: ADJUSTMENT, PARENTAL
CONFLICT, CUSTODY, REMARRIAGE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CLINICIANS 35-39 (1998)
(discussing why conflicts between parents serve as predictions of negative outcomes for
children).
21. See id.; see also Pfeffer, supra note 10, at 20-33.
22. See STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 8.
23. See Pfeffer, supra note 10, at 22.
24. See id. at 24-26 (discussing the effects of divorce upon the child's environment).
25. See Lamb, supra note 8, at 395.
26. See Pfeffer, supra note 10, at 22.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 23.
30. See id.
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resolve their interpersonal conflicts. 31 However, in some cases,
conflicts persist. These conflicts may potentially involve the child,
thereby exposing the child to hostility beyond the stereotypical
negativity emanating from one parent towards the other because
they are divorced. 32 Thus, the same conflicts and negative relation-
ships that existed before the divorce may continue, thereby harming
the child.33 In addition, one parent may co-opt the child to join her
in undermining the other parent.34 The child may also perceive an
ability to manipulate the parents, either for a reunion or for a
perpetuated conflict. 3' Finally, friends, family, and relatives may
provoke conflict between the parents, thereby exposing the child to
continued stress.36
Third, divorce may be detrimental to a child's cognitive
development, leading to problems in school performance and
behavior.37 Cognition is defined as thought, belief, and information
processing."8 One's ability to process information and remember
things can be adversely affected by a highly upset and emotional
state, such as divorce. 39 However, some studies have shown that
there are "no lasting effects of divorce on child development."
40
Fourth, scholars found that the potential negative effects on
children's emotional and social development are greater for children
of divorce.4' Studies have demonstrated that children of divorce
have more behavioral problems than do children with intact
families. 41 "Generally, parental conflict increases the likelihood of
behavioral problems and adjustment difficulty for children."43 In
addition, children of divorce are more likely to use illicit substances
and be juvenile delinquents.44 Children of high conflict divorced
31. See id. at 22-26.
32. See id. at 23.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 59-72 (discussing the effects of divorce on
a child's cognitive development).
38. See id. at 59.
39. See id.
40. WILLIAM F. HODGES, INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: CUSTODY, ACCESS,
AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 36 (1986).
41. See STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 73-112 (discussing the impact of divorce
on gender roles, romantic relationships, and antisocial behavior).
42. See id. at 101.
43. Id. at 31.
44. See id. at 101-07.
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couples who continually fight and litigate are also more likely to be
emotionally disturbed.4"
C. How Children Cope
Divorce brings a need to cope with life changes. Children
develop several coping mechanisms as a result of the various
stresses and the effects of such stresses that they encounter. These
coping responses may reflect the parents' adjustments to the
situation and may mimic the behavior of the parents." Some of
these coping methods address changing belief systems, social
support, social problem-solving skills, and avoidance.4 v
During a divorce, children experience changes in beliefs that
they hold about family life.4' These changing beliefs influence the
children's adjustments to divorce.49 Moreover, this adjustment to
divorce can be positively or negatively affected by the parents'
adjustments.5 0 The feelings of loss that occur may require the
children to understand that families continue when apart and that
children can have more than one home.5' A related part to this
issue revolves around the children's needs to believe that they will
continue to receive care. 2
Social support is also important to the child's adjustment to
divorce. 3 Social support is "the existence of people and experiences
that lead the individual to believe that he or she is cared for, loved,
esteemed, and valued."54 Children deal more effectively with
stressful life events when they have social support, which is
provided by a continued relationship with both parents.55
Social problem-solving skills can be both affected and developed
during a divorce. 56  An active approach in dealing with life's
45. See Lamb, supra note 8, at 396 (noting that children of divorce were more likely to
be emotionally disturbed because the interparental struggle took precedence over the
children's personal circumstances and developmental needs).
46. See STEVENSON & BLAcK, supra note 8, at 35-38 (discussing various coping
strategies); see also COMMI'IrEE ON THE FAMILY GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND THE FAMILY 64 (1980) [hereinafter COMMITTEE]
(noting that a child's symptoms may mirror those of a parent).
47. See STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 35-36.
48. See id. at 36.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 37.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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frustrations should exist by considering and trying a variety of
approaches in one's own life or seeking information from others.57
This process is facilitated when both parents actively participate in
the child's life during a divorce.58
Avoidance is the fourth means of coping with the stresses of
divorce.59 It is characterized by avoiding stress, either actively or
passively."° Developing a pattern of avoidance as a means of coping
with the stresses of divorce, however, can lead to problems in
present and future relationships for children.61 Feelings of loss or
betrayal may cause the child to avoid future relationships which
could expose her to similar betrayal again.62 This phenomenon may
also lead to frustration for noncustodial parents when their access
to their children causes more stress in the children, thus potentially
causing the noncustodial parent to withdraw herself from the
family, in order to reduce stress around the child.63
D. Benefits of the Relationship Between the Child and the
Noncustodial Parent
In light of the stresses of divorce, the effects of those stressors,
and the potential methods of coping with those effects, several
positive benefits result from maintaining the relationship between
the child and the noncustodial parent. For instance, continued
contact between the child and the noncustodial parent may lead to
improved cognitive and social development for the child.64 It will
also help the child address negative feelings about the divorce.65
Finally, it may improve or reinforce the noncustodial parent's
willingness to contribute her financial support.
Maintaining the relationship between the child and the
noncustodial parent may have significant positive effects on the
cognitive and social development of the child. Although the
frequency and predictability of visitation may not be determinative
of the child's post-divorce adjustment, the quality of the relation-
57. See id.
58. See id. at 36.
59. See id. at 37.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 38.
62. See id.
63. See HODGES, supra note 40, at 151.
64. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text; see also COMMITTEE, supra note 46, at
66-68 (noting studies detailing the consequences of separation on children).
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ship with the noncustodial parent is important.66 Even under
conditions of high interparental conflict, cognitive development is
shown to improve with frequent contact between the child and the
noncustodial parent. 7 In addition, the relationship between the
child and the noncustodial parent may benefit the social develop-
ment of the child. "Basic trust and self-esteem are maintained in
the child by having predictable parents who care."
6 8
Moreover, the relationship may assist both the parents and the
child when working through their negative feelings concerning the
divorce. 69 The child may experience feelings of stress, guilt, loss,
or inadequacy over the divorce.7° Many children feel that the
divorce is their fault, causing them to carry this emotional guilt for
the rest of their lives, affecting every serious relationship they
subsequently have.7 ' The child needs the emotional support of both
parents for several reasons. Each parent then has the opportunity
to show her "side of the story," potentially defusing negative
comments'and characterizations made by the other parent.72 Even
if the parent does not affirmatively explain the other's negative
statements, the parent is present to serve as an example and role
model, thus counteracting untrue statements made by the other
parent. Moreover, each parent may have something different to
offer the child in terms of emotional support, thereby complement-
ing each other.73 The child will feel less guilt or inadequacy when
she is able to maintain a stable, strong relationship with the
noncustodial parent, rather than when the noncustodial parent and
the child have a weak relationship or none at all.74
Maintaining this relationship also has societal benefits. When
noncustodial parents have meaningful relationships with their
children, they are more willing and likely to contribute financial
support.7" This support ranges from paying court-ordered child
support to paying willingly for other expenses. When noncustodial
parents have a strong relationship with their children, the financial
66. See TWAITE, supra note 20, at 336.
67. See Rex Forehand et al., Interparental Conflict and Paternal Visitation Following
Divorce: The Interactive Effect on Adolescent Competence, 20 CHILD STUDYJ. 193, 199 (1990).
68. HODGES, supra note 40, at 151.
69. See Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 18, at 107.
70. See Pfeffer, supra note 10, at 23.
71. See id.
72. See Forehand, supra note 67, at 199.
73. See Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 18, at 109.
74. See id. at 107.
75. See JUDITH CAsSETTY, THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION .144-47 (1983)
(noting a correlation between the frequency of parental visits with the child and the
willingness to financially support the child).
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burden of supporting the child is less likely to seem so onerous. v6
In addition, when noncustodial parents are supported by the courts
in maintaining this strong relationship, they tend to pay child
support more regularly." This phenomenon upholds the child's
economic interests, but also has important social implications in
that it is far more effective and efficient to encourage and enforce
visitation than to pursue noncustodial parents with child support
enforcement services."v It takes fewer resources to make noncus-
todial parents feel as though they are part of their children's lives
and thus willingly pay child support, than to focus upon a child
support enforcement system which pursues garnishment of wages
and other collection means without any connection to visitation.v9
In summary, due to the stresses, their effects, and coping
mechanisms of children of divorce, these children are at a height-
ened risk for problematic development. However, these risks are
ameliorated when the children have a strong relationship with their
noncustodial parents.
III. WHY A VISITATION STANDARD Is NECESSARY
"In the best of all possible worlds, all parents would agree that
their concern for their children's welfare is separate, apart from,
and transcends any animosity, feelings of rejection or desire for
revenge, or self-interest the parents may have with regard to each
other.""° However, any conflict between the parents may prevent
the custodial parent from agreeing upon visitation. In order to
counter the effects of these circumstances, the judicial system needs
a visitation standard which will ensure that children and
noncustodial parents are able to maintain the strong relationships
with each other that are necessary for the healthy development of
the child, both during and after the divorce.
Two basic policies behind visitation exist. The first policy
involves the right of the child to the emotional, social, and educa-
tional benefits resulting from the most stable relationship possible
with both parents."' The second policy consists of the right of the
76. See id.
77. See JESSICA PEARSON & JEAN ANHALT, THE CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, THE
VISITATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: IMPACT ON CHILD ACCESS AND CHILD SUPPORT 11
(1992) (noting a correlation between visitation and economic support).
78. See CASSETTY, supra note 75, at 152-55.
79. See id.
80. FLORENCE W. KAsLOw & LITA L. SCHWARTZ, THE DYNAMICS OF DIVORCE 116 (1987).
81. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
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noncustodial parent to know and share the love of the child.82
Whereas a custody determination contains the standard for
governing who shall have primary physical custody of the child as
well as guidelines for making that determination, a visitation
determination should contain the means for governing the access
that the child and the noncustodial parent will have to each other
and the guidelines for determining that access. By deciding on the
access, the visitation standard offers several benefits in that: (1) it
ensures that the child's and the noncustodial parent's rights of
access to each other will be protected; (2) it ensures that the child's
needs for a relationship with both parents will be protected; (3) it
provides clear guidance for decision-makers in visitation disputes;
and (4) it clarifies what the courts will order and enforce in the
absence of an agreement on visitation between the parents, further
reducing sources of arguments between parents.
A. Rights of Access
Children have a right of access to both parents, including the
noncustodial parent.8 3 The relationship between children and
parents is a vital one that is accorded much protection by the
courts." This relationship, when disrupted by divorce, is subject to
control by the state, due to the state's parens patriae interest in
protecting children when their physical or mental health is
jeopardized. 5 Children's rights of access to their noncustodial
parents are important. "Sound public policy encourages the
maintenance of the parent-child relationship.8 6 When the courts
protect that right of access on the child's behalf, rather than leaving
the child in the position where the child must invoke it on her own
behalf, the child, theoretically, is shielded from the conflict between
the parents.8 7
82. See In re Marriage of Delf, 528 P.2d 96, 99 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
83. See In re Welfare of J.D.N., 504 N.W.2d 54, 58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("Rights that
flow to the child from the parent and child relationship certainly include visitation with the
noncustodial parent.").
84. See Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Ark. 1979) (en banc) ("[Tihe rights of parents
to the care, custody, and upbringing of their children are the subject of constitutional
protection on both due process and equal protection standards.").
85. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) ("[A] state is not without constitu-
tional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental
health is jeopardized.").
86. In re Marriage of Campbell, 633 N.E.2d 797, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (affirming the
principle that only in extreme cases may the court deprive parents of visitation).
87. See HODGES, supra note 40, at 151.
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The custodial parent is often hurt and angry at the noncustodial,
parent. If the child is attached to the custodial parent, the wish
to please that parent may place the child in a very rough
position. Expression of a wish to see the other parent may
invite upset and rejection. Clear visitation rules free the child
from some of the psychological pressures of pleasing each
parent.88
Today, although courts focus predominately on the best
interests of the child in most custody and visitation determinations,
noncustodial parents also have rights of access to their children
which are often overlooked in the best interests determination. 9
Noncustodial parents' visitation rights ensue from the fact that they
are their children's parents.90 This right is essential to the
continuance and maintenance of their parent-child relationship.9 1
Even in the absence of an express order of visitation, the parent
who does not have custody of a child has a legal right to visit the
child. However, this right generally does not permit the parent to
force the child to visit her against that child's wishes.92
A clearly defined and easy-to-follow visitation standard
satisfies the children's needs to have relationships with both
parents. This need is great because of the increased stresses of
divorce and their potential negative effects on the children.93
Moreover, as stated previously, children have a greater risk of
suffering from stress.94 The negative effects of divorce can be
ameliorated, however, when the child and the noncustodial parent
maintain a strong personal relationship.95 A visitation standard
which promotes this parent-child relationship also protects children
88. Id.
89. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (describing the use of the best interests
standard in custody determinations).
90. See Clarke v. Clarke, 217 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1950) (en banc) (noting that in the absence
of an express prohibition in the divorce decree, visitation rights ensue by right of
parenthood).
91. See Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978) ("[Vlisitation is to be
regarded as a parental right essential to the continuance and maintenance of a child-to-
parent relationship between the child and noncustodial parent.").
92. See In re Marriage of Brown, 597 N.E.2d 1297 (1992) (stating that if a young adult
is unwilling to visit the noncustodial parent, the trial court may not hold the custodial parent
in contempt for violating a visitation decree).
93. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (discussing the various causes and effects of divorce).
94. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of divorce on
children).
95. See supra Part II.D (discussing the positive effects of a strong relationship between
a child and the non-custodial parent).
CURING THE "EVERY-OTHER-WEEKEND SYNDROME"
from the negative effects that could occur if that relationship were
to be weakened or dissolved entirely."
B. Guidance for Decision-Makers
A visitation standard provides guidance for decision-makers,
such as judges. This guidance is necessary because many of these
decision-makers lack training or experience in addressing the needs
of children of divorce." Rather than forcing the decision-makers to
use their discretion and rely solely upon their own judgment or lack
of experience, a visitation standard provides guidelines for them.
C. Guidance for Parents
In addition to providing guidance for the decision-maker, an
easily understood visitation standard allows parents to better
predict what the decision-maker will order should the parents be
unable to agree upon visitation. In certain states, the courts also
allow parties to negotiate the custody and visitation arrangements
and present them to the court for approval.98 However, because of
the parents' emotional involvement in the divorce proceedings, they
may be unable to objectively, decide what the children need.
Furthermore, they may lack the knowledge to determine which
judicial processes should govern custody and visitation. Moreover,
in contentious divorces, an increased tendency for one or both
parties to viciously litigate custody and visitation may exist.99
Thus, parent-created visitation arrangements are frequently not
successful.
A visitation standard provides the best alternative to a
negotiated agreement, allowing a party to understand what the
decision-maker would order so that the noncustodial parent does
not have to settle for less than the decision-maker would grant.
This provides tremendous leverage for noncustodial parents, as
they neither lose time with the child nor bargain away other issues,
such as spousal support or custody, in order to have more time with
96. See supra notes 8-45 (discussing the various causes and effects of divorce).
97. See Norman Scheresky, "Know Thy Judge," in CONTEMPORARY MATRIMONIAL LAW
IssUES: A GUIDE TO DIVORCE ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE 641 (Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Ronald
L. Brown eds., 1985) ("It is not at all uncommon... that many judges adopt views based on
their own marriage rather than on the laws they are obliged to follow.").
98. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-317 (1998); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.1 (West 1998).
99. See generally PEARSON & ANHALT, supra note 77 (discussing the relationship between
child access and child support).
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the child."° Consequently, the standard may reduce the number of
disputes over visitation because the parties will know what to
expect from the judge should they fail to reach an agreement. 10' A
visitation standard, therefore, is necessary to protect the children's
rights of access with their noncustodial parents, to protect their
relationships with their noncustodial parents, to provide guidance
for decision-makers, and to reduce arguments that the visitation
issue may elicit.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW
Custody and visitation law has developed within the last one
hundred and fifty years. The history of custody law is "reflective of
the greater social and economic forces that shape values and thus
the law these values create[ ."' This section will analyze the
interaction between custody and visitation by providing an
historical overview (including the different theories of custody
determination and the different societal views on the issue of
custody), as well as the current state of the law (including how the
states implement the prevalent custody and visitation standards).
A. History of the Development of Custody and Visitation Law
Over time, several different theories of custody determination
have evolved.0 3 In the mid- to late-nineteenth century, fathers
were awarded custody of children on the presumption that they
owned the children.'0 4 Gradually, in the early twentieth century,
this view was replaced with the "tender years" doctrine, a maternal
preference standard. 5 The tender years doctrine stated that
children under a certain age (varying by state),10 6 were more stable
when placed in the custody of their mothers. 7 This was predicated
100. See MICHAEL WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR DIVORCING PARENTS
63 (1980).
101. See EMERY, supra note 19, at 67.
102. JAMES BLACK & DONALD CANTON, CHILD CUSTODY 15 (1989).
103. See generally MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHERS' PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (tracing the historical
development of legal rules determining who should have custody and control over a child).
104. See BLACK & CANTON, supra note 102, at 4.
105. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 7.
106. See COMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 29.
107. See THOMAS OAKLAND, DIVORCED FATHERS 106 (1984).
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on the belief that women were more nurturing than men and were
also more capable of meeting the needs of young children.'l s
Gradually, the tender years doctrine eroded. The movement
toward gender equality during the 1960s fostered the idea that men
and women were equally capable of nurturing and taking care of
children.0 9 The greater movement of women into the workforce
and out of their traditional roles of homemaker and caretaker
spurred the break-up of gender stereotypes.110 During the 1970s,
some courts also struck down gender-preference determinations
under the Equal Protection Clause. 1 '
The primary caretaker doctrine replaced the tender years
doctrine. The primary caretaker doctrine states that the child's
welfare would be better served if the court placed the child with the
parent who had been the child's primary caretaker before the
divorce."' The premise behind the primary caretaker doctrine is
the belief that the child would best survive the rigors of divorce and
would best have her needs met by staying with the parent who had
attended to her caretaking and needs the most." 3 This doctrine
was further based on the assumptions that the person who had
attended to the child before the divorce was the most knowledgeable
of the two parents as to the child's needs, and that the child had a
greater emotional bond with that parent.14 The perceived advan-
tages of this doctrine included that it was easily determinable and
gender-neutral." 5 However, in practice, this supposedly gender-
neutral determination came to favor women far more than men
because women were still more likely to have been the primary
108. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (holding that a state's refusal to grant a
woman a license to practice law did not violate the U.S. Constitution). Justice Bradley stated
in his concurring opinion that "[tihe paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." Id. at 141. See also Kathryn L. Mercer, A
Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making-How Judges Use the Primary Caretaker
Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAw 1, 26 (1998).
109. See Leighton E. Stamps et al., Judicial Attitudes Regarding Custody and Visitation
Issues, 25 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 23, 25 (1996).
110. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 1, at 8.
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285
(1973); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
112. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981) (creating a presumption in
favor of the primary caretaker parent if she meets the minimum objective standard for being
a fit parent); see also WEBSTER WATNK, CHILD CUSTODY MADE SIMPLE 43 (1997) (listing the
current primary caretaker, established residence, logistics, religion, remarriage, sex,
drinking and drugs, abuse and violence, work and income, school, and children's issues as
being the factors that influence custody determinations).
113. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362-63.
114. See id. at 364; see also SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD RELATION-
SHIPS 155-56 (1992).
115. See EMERY, supra note 19, at 75.
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caretakers during this time period, despite the advances toward
gender equality. 116
The latest standard is the "best interests of the child" standard.
The best interests standard is designed to look at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the child and determine her placement
with the parent who will best serve the child's interests.117 This
standard has gained widespread acceptance among the states due
to its goals.118 However, it has come under criticism for its vague-
ness because there is no standard definition of what constitutes the
best interests of the child." 9 This standard is generally accompa-
nied by guidelines directing the decision-maker to look at certain
factors to determine which home and parent would best serve the
child's interests. 2 ° These factors include: the wishes of the child's
parents as to her custody; the wishes of the child as to her custo-
dian; the interaction and interrelationship of the child with her
parents or other relevant persons; the child's adjustment to her
home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health
of all individuals involved.' 2 ' However, these six factors do not
disclose all of the relevant information to show where the child's
best interests are truly served. Thus, in almost all of the states, the
custody determination is made according to the best interests of the
child standard, accompanied by guidelines directing the decision-
maker to look at several additional factors. 122
In addition to the aforementioned progression of custody
determinations in state statutes, changes in how society views
divorce and custody have also evolved.'23 In the past, society looked
upon divorce as being the result of a failure to work, or a failure to
want to keep the marriage intact, or as the result of a fault of one
or both parties. 124  Society still tends to disfavor divorce.'25
116. See Cheryl Buehler & Jean M. Gerard, Divorce Law in the United States: A Focus
on Child Custody, 44 FAM. REL. 439, 442 (1995).
117. See EMERY, supra note 19, at 74-75.
118. All states use the best interests of the child standard, with the exception of West
Virginia, which uses the primary caretaker standard. See generally Garska, 278 S.E.2d 357.
119. See Buehler & Gerard, supra note 116, at 441; EMERY, supra note 19, at 74; see also
WATNIK, supra note 112, at 42 (noting that some critics have argued that the best interests
standard creates judicial bias resulting in decisions that vary by judge).
120. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).
121. See id.
122. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
123. See generally LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM (1980) (discussing the changes
in divorce law and the changing attitudes towards divorce over time).
124. See ALLEN PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 13 (1992).
125. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 8, at 6-7 (discussing how attitudes against
divorce have relaxed over time).
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However, some people view divorce as a necessarily contentious
situation. Frequent arguing may provide these individuals with
some therapeutic benefit, allowing them to express their anger and
hurt at the perceived reasons for the divorce, regardless of the true
causes.'26 These parents may view every issue throughout the
divorce proceeding, including custody, as a win or lose situation. 127
Members of society, when looking from the outside, tend to shape
their views to conform to this combative stereotype.128
It is no surprise that, given this stereotypical view of divorce as
war, people view custody as a win or lose situation. Whoever gets
custody of the child wins, and whoever does not get custody loses.
The statutes tend to reflect this view. 129 Thus, for many years,
"Custody" of the child meant that one parent was awarded "Sole
Custody," thereby having- physical possession of the child and
having sole decision-making authority in her life. The noncustodial
parent was awarded "Visitation," meaning that the noncustodial
parent had scheduled time with the child. 3 ° This system reduced
the noncustodial parent's status to less than that of a parent, as she
had little or no authority to make decisions in the child's life. In a
vicious cycle, this reinforced the stereotype that noncustodial
parents were not important to their children's lives, resulting in
others not treating them as the real parents of their children.''
Many noncustodial parents perceived from both society and the
courts an attitude that they should be thankful for whatever time
they had with their children. Other noncustodial parents also felt
that they should be grateful that the court ordered any visitation or
that the custodial parent agreed to it through negotiations or
mediation.3 2
126. See COMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 101-03.
127. See Christy L. Hendricks, Note, The Trend Toward Mandatory Mediation in Custody
and Visitation Disputes of Minor Children: An Overview, 16 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAm. L. 491,
494 (1994).
128. See STEVENSON & BLACK, supra note 8, at 2.
129. For example, the Alaska statute states "if there is a dispute over child custody...
[t]he court shall award custody on the basis of the best interests of the child." ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.20.060(a) (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).
130. See generally MASON, supra note 103 (tracing the historical development of legal rules
determining who shall have custody and control over a child).
131. See WHEELER, supra note 100, at 62 (discussing the stereotype of the lesser important
non-custodial parent). But see generally GERALD SILVER & MYRNA SILVER, WEEKEND
FATHERS (1981) (discussing the positive experiences of non-custodial fathers).
132. See Daniel C. Schuman, Psychiatric Aspects of Custody Loss, in CHILDREN OF
SEPARATION AND DIVORCE: MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT 54-75 (Irving R. Stuart &
Lawrence E. Abt eds., 1981).
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Some notions about divorce have changed slightly over the past
few decades. The rise of no fault divorce has led the courts away
from the traditional view of divorce that relied upon an adversarial
system, dependent upon proof of fault.'33 In addition, divorce has
become fairly common today, as compared to in the past. 13 4 Along
with the rise in the number of divorces has also come an acceptance
that marriages are dissolved, not because individuals are irrespon-
sible or at fault, but because sometimes spouses simply cannot co-
exist.13
5
Legislatures introduced the concept of joint custody to allow
both parents to have decision-making authority in their child's life
and to be equally recognized as parents to their children. 13
Because a child simply cannot live with both parents at once, the
court grants "primary physical custody" to one parent and
"parenting time" or "access time" to the noncustodial parent. 137 The
premise behind joint custody is that both parents can cooperate and
parent their child together, regardless of the fact that they are rio
longer married. 13
Although initially courts only ordered joint custody in cases
where the parents clearly were able and willing to cooperate with
each other, in some states, courts order it even when one parent
does not endorse it.139  This phenomenon has evolved with the
gradual recognition that a lack of primary physical custody does
not, and should not, terminate a parent's ability or authority to be
a parent to her children. " ° Today, the emerging view of custody is
that joint custody permits both parents to remain active parents,
133. See PARKMAN, supra note 124, at 13.
134. See OAKLAND, supra note 107, at 107.
135. See id.
136. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 166.
[Jloint custody typically implies a situation following a divorce in which both
parents continue to exercise shared responsibility for their child's upbringing.
This responsibility typically addresses significant matters in a child's life ....
It does not necessarily require joint physical custody... [where the] child may
share relatively equal time with both parents .... A decision to award joint
custody is generally based on the court's discretion that such a relationship
would be in the best interests of the child.
Id.
137. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 722.26a, 722.27 (West 1993) (providing for
custody grants to both the custodial and non-custodial parents).
138. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 166.
139. For example, some states allow joint custody when both parents want it or only one
parent wants it. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989 & Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
125.490 (Michie 1997).
140. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (describing the importance of a
relationship between the child and a noncustodial parent).
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even though the child cannot simultaneously live with both of
them. 14'
B. Overview of Current Custody and Visitation Law
The current state of divorce law requires analysis. In order to
understand how state legislatures have provided for the relation-
ship between the child and parents after separation or divorce, it is
important to study the various themes in this area of the law. This
section will discuss public policy declarations behind custody and
visitation law, the standards used for determining custody and
visitation, and the factors included in the custody and visitation
standards.
1. Declarations of Legislative Intent
A few states actually declare the legislative intent, or public
policy determinations, behind their custody and visitation
statutes.14 2 Most states, however, do not make any mention of the
policy behind their custody and visitation determinations, beyond
mentioning the "best interests" standard. 4 1
Of the states with express legislative declarations, the intent
is expressed as twofold: to assure that the child has a meaningful
relationship with both parents after the separation or dissolution
of the marriage, and to encourage parents to share the rights and
responsibilities of raising the child.'" The relationship between the
child and her parents is variously stated as: "frequent and
continuing contact," 45 "reasonable and continuing contact," 46
"frequent associations and a continuing relationship, 47 or "the
opportunity for maximum continuing physical and emotional
141. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 166.
142. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-460 (Michie 1998); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Supp. 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 1991 & Supp.
1998) (providing declarations of policy by state legislatures).
143. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1995) ("Any order for custody shall include
such terms, including visitation, as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child.").
144. While the language may differ, these declarations share the same intent. See infra
notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
145. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Supp. 1998) (mentioning frequent and continuing contact as being
the goal of custody and visitation determinations).
146. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
147. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-460 (Michie 1998).
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contact."148 The sharing of rights and responsibilities between the
parents is variously stated as an encouragement, 14 an assurance," °
or an urging.
151
Thus, only the few aforementioned states clearly announce the
objectives of their custody and visitation determinations. While
others may state the intent of the determination within their
statutes, the majority of the states do not offer any legislative
purpose. For example, Arkansas states that "custody shall be
awarded in such a way as to assure the frequent and continuing
contact of the child with both parents."'52 Of the states that have
no explicit declaration of legislative intent or public policy, some
have a stated purpose within their custody and visitation
statutes. '
3
2. Custody and Visitation Standards
Twenty states provide for visitation to be determined sepa-
rately from custody." Thirty states have no separate visitation
provisions; they either provide for visitation to be determined along
with custody in an overall "Custody" determination or make no
mention of visitation at all.15 5 All states but West Virginia use the
148. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1998).
149. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1998); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-460
(Michie 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Supp. 1998).
150. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 1998) (declaring that the goal of the
legislature is "to assure a reasonable and continuing contact of the child with both parents.").
151. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1998) (declaring that the legislature "urges parents
to share the rights and responsibilities of child-rearing.").
152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1997).
153. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408A (West Supp. 1998) (noting that "[a] parent not
granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights to ensure that the
minor child has frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent.").
154. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100 (West
Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728 (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46
(Michie Supp. 1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.41 (West Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. Cr.
CODE ANN. art. 136 (West Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 (West Supp. 1998);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (West Supp. 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.400 (West 1997), N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (West Supp. 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West Supp. 1999); 23 PA. CONS, STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West Supp.
1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-9 (1996 & Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (Supp.
1998); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.311 through § 153.317 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113 (Michie 1997).
155. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989 & Supp. 1997); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (Michie 1998);
ARK CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1998); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1998); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-9-1 (Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (Michie
1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (West
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"best interests of the child" standard when determining custody. 156
Of the twenty states that have separate visitation provisions,
the statutes range from providing no guidance, other than the
mention of the term "visitation," to setting guidelines for the
visitation time periods. Ten states direct the decision-maker to
order visitation,157 reasonable visitation, 58 reasonable visitation
rights,"9 or liberal visitation where appropriate. 160  Two states
direct the decision-maker to consider the child's best interests when
determining visitation.' 6 ' Four states emphasize the maintenance
of the parent-child relationship between the child and the
noncustodial parent,162 and two states emphasize the maintenance
of the parent-child relationship between the child and both
parents. 163 Pennsylvania directs the decision-maker to consider
"any other factor which legitimately impacts the child's physical,
intellectual, and emotional wellbeing." 64  The Texas statute is
unique because it has standardized time periods for the visitation,
which are presumed to be in the best interests of the child. 165
1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203 (Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28
(West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1994 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212
(1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Supp. 1997); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480 (Michie 1998);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1992 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Supp.
1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240
(Consol. Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (Supp.
1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
25-4-45 (Michie Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (1989 & Supp. 1998); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.184 (West 1997 & Supp.
1999); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 1998).
156. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (establishing the use of the
primary caretaker standard when determining custody).
157. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113
(Michie 1997),
158. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (Michie Supp. 1997).
159. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100 (West Supp. 1999); 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West
Supp. 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136
(West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.400 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-9 (1996 &
Supp. 1998).
160. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1998).
161. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728 (Supp. 1998) (stating that the court will determine
custody and visitation according to the "child's best interests and maturity."); see also UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1998) (explaining that the court grants Visitation rights after
considering the child's best interests).
162. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175
(West Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (Supp.
1998).
163. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 (West Supp. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.051 (West Supp. 1998).
164. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West Supp. 1998).
165. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.311 through § 153.317 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
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Of the twenty-nine states that do not have separate visitation
provisions, courts use different methods to determine custody and
visitation. Sixteen states use the word "Custody" as the sole
determination to be made at the divorce, inclusive of both custody
and visitation.166 It is assumed that these statutes imply that
"Custody" includes determinations of custody (physical placement
with the custodial parent) and visitation. However, this interpreta-
tion is not explicitly stated in any of them. Of these, half of the
statutes delineate factors to be used when determining "Custody.
" 167
Moreover, six states explicitly use the same "Custody" determina-
tion to determine both custody and visitation. 16 Four of those six
states give a list of the factors considered by the court.6 9 Two of
those states direct the decision-maker to determine what shall be
the parents' "parental rights and responsibilities," of which custody
and visitation are each a part.i7 ° Two other states also mandate
that the parents present a "parenting plan" before the court,
whereby each parent's time with the child is arranged according to
the plan's schedule.' Two states focus almost solely on joint
custody, and are almost completely silent on visitation.7 2  New
York, which mentions that visitation may be brought as an action
separate from custody, has no provisions for determining
visitation.7 3  The courts in all of these twenty-nine states base
custody decisions on the best interests of the child.
166. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1998);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 32-
717B (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp.
1997); MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 5-203 (Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.208, § 28
(West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1994 & Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480
(Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1992 & Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-
160 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (Michie Supp. 1998).
167. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997); IDAHO
CODE § 32-717B (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610
(Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480 (Michie 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie
1994 & Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (Supp. 1998).
168. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (Michie 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Supp. 1997);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Supp. 1998), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-124.2 (Michie Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 1998).
169. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (Michie 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Supp. 1997);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 1998).
170. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (West 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665
(1989 & Supp. 1998).
171. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.184 (West
1997 & Supp. 1999).
172. Alabama provides for sole custody in cases of domestic abuse, with the other parent
having visitation, but it is mentioned only in passing. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989 & Supp.
1997); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1999).
173. See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 240 (Consol. Supp. 1998).
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V. How THE LAW IS TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICE
States are not translating current visitation law into a practice
that addresses the necessities and goals of a visitation standard. As
discussed in the previous section, the states that incorporate the
visitation determination into the "Custody" determination rarely
explicitly guide the courts to determine visitation every bit as
thoroughly as custody. 74 In addition, the states that make the
visitation determinations separately from the custody determina-
tions usually provide a vague standard and rarely give clear
guidelines as to how to meet that standard.'75 As a result, there is
a great potential for visitation determinations to be given much less
attention than custody determinations. Coupled with the lingering
societal attitude that noncustodial parents are unnecessary and
have little authority in their children's lives,' it is no surprise that
visitation determinations are perceived as being made almost as an
afterthought.
This lack of clear guidance in state statutes arises from several
factors. Many statutes do not give visitation determinations the
same emphasis that custody determinations receive. 7 7 As men-
tioned before, visitation determinations fall into one of two
categories: those that are a part of a "Custody" determination,
where visitation is determined together with custody, and those
that determine visitation separately. In the former category, the
intent to treat visitation the same as custody is lost; in the latter
category, there is no expressed intent to treat visitation the same
as custody. In both categories, visitation usually is treated as being
of lesser importance than custody.
When states incorporate both the custody and visitation
determinations into the "Custody" determination, the legislative
intent to place the child in the custody of the parent who will be
best able to meet the child's needs is clear. The standard is the best
interests of the child, and the guidelines present factors to deter-
mine with whom that interest will best be met. However, the
statutes generally lack legislative guidance that explicitly points
out that the "Custody" determination also includes a visitation
determination that is subject to the same standard and
174. See supra notes 166, 170-73.
175. See supra notes 157-65.
176. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 154-73.
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guidelines.' Indeed, a general lack of expressed legislative:intent
that parent-child relationships outside of the custodial parent-child
relationship should remain intact exists.' 9  I : i.
When states treat custody and visitation separately, custody
determinations have a specific standard, usually the best interests
of the child, as well as guidelines to determine how the courts best
meet those interests. However, visitation statutes usually have a
one-sentence standard and few or no guidelines. 8 ° The same
problems arise in the "Custody" determinations. Commonly, the
statutes will have language discussing the necessity of meeting the
child's best interests, but rarely will the statutes define what the
best interests of the child include.' Rather, the statutes will
contain extensive language and treatment of the need for a strong
relationship with the custodial parent and for a stable home life,
but will neglect to discuss the relationship between the
noncustodial parent and the child. s2
In light of this lack of emphasis on visitation, how is visitation
usually determined? Visitation usually follows several patterns,
with several justifications. By far, the most prevalent pattern
consists of having the child visit the noncustodial parent every
other weekend, usually overnight from Friday evening until Sunday
evening. 83  The pattern usually includes alternating holidays
between parents, such as Christmas, Easter, and the child's
birthday."' It can also include blocks of time with the noncustodial
parent over summers or spending one evening per week with the
noncustodial parent. 8 '
In joint custody situations, where both parents share parenting
authority, the child spends some time with the noncustodial parent
and some time with the custodial parent, whose only unique
characteristic is that the child primarily resides with that parent.
This time that the child spends with the noncustodial parent is
supposed to be family time, equivalent to the time the child spends
in the care of the custodial parent. However, most people generally
178. See supra note 143.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2B (Michie Supp. 1998) (providing no
definition of the best interests of the child).
182. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 111.1 (West 1990 & 1999).
183. See A REPORT ON CIRCUIT COURT STANDARD VISITATION SCHEDULES, STAFF OF THE
FLORIDA SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 5 (1995).
184. See WATNIK, supra note 112, 87-96 (discussing issues that should be considered when
creating a schedule for the child's living arrangements).
185. See id.
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:perceive it as a brief interlude from the care, dominion, and control
of the custodial parent.116 This misperception is exacerbated when
the jurisdiction continues to refer both to this time as "visitation,"
which carries the sole custody connotations, and to refer to the time
spent with the noncustodial parent as an "award," which carries the
negative win/lose connotations.' 87 In addition, this phenomenon
propagates the notion that visitation is a privilege granted to the
noncustodial parent, rather than an enforcement of the parental
right to see the child.
Other visitation determinations can include trying to equalize
the time spent with each parent; continually switching primary
physical custody according to a prearranged schedule;8 8 or, in some
extreme cases, leaving the children in' one house and having the
parents move in and out according to a prearranged schedule.8 9
Decision-makers are reluctant to order or approve such schedules
because they perceive such constant "shuttling" of the child from
home to home as depriving the child of the stability, security, and
comfort associated with one home. 9 ° The perceived need for
"stability" in the child's life leads decision-makers to favor leaving
the child in one home continuously.' 9
Such need for stability is one of the primary justifications for
the every-other-weekend pattern, especially as society perceives
children as having a definite need for stability during their
developmental years.' 92 Some understand this stability as being
best achieved when the child has one home.'93 Some scholars have
even advocated the extreme position that the child should never
leave the home to spend any time with the noncustodial parent. 194
186. See Shriver v. Shriver, 219 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) ("Visitation rights
are limitations or restrictions upon child custody, and the only provision for such limitation
is that contained in the statute with respect only to the divorced parent deprived of
custody.").
187. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(3) (Michie 1998) (stating that "[tihe court
shall award custody."). This language typifies how a court makes a custody determination.
188. See BLAU, supra note 11, at 163.
189. See id. at 162.
190. See Elebash v. Elebash, 450 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
the trial court's finding that moving the children between residences to achieve a nearly
equal division of time between the parents deprived the children of stability, security, and
comfort); Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("Generally,
rotating custody is presumptively not in the best interests of the child.").
191. See BLAu, supra note 11, at 163.
192. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979) (stressing the importance of continuity in the relationship between the child and the
custodial parent).
193. See id.
194. See id.
435
436 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 5411
This argument completely ignores the other detrimental effects the
child faces from never having a relationship with both parents.'95
A subterfuge for the primary caretaker doctrine, the stability
argument, maintains that too much time away from the de facto
primary caretaker, the custodial parent, is not in the child's best
interests. Those who make this argument also incorrectly presume
that time away from the custodial parent would be as detrimental
to the child as if her primary caretaker were no longer raising
her. 196
A second justification for the every-other-weekend pattern
includes its inception as the de facto visitation standard and
guideline. This circular argument asserts that because every-other-
weekend has been in use for so long, and has become so common, it
should continue to be used.' 97
A third justification for the every-other-weekend pattern is that
the pattern is in the best interests of the child, despite any
inconvenience it poses for the custodial parent. According to this
argument, having to deliver the child to the noncustodial parent
frequently inconveniences the custodial parent.'98 Having to give
up three or four weekends a month leaves the custodial parent with
no weekends to spend with the child. However, this argument
ignores the fact that the focus of custody and visitation should be on
the best interests of the child, not the parents.' 99 It also ignores the
fact that the custodial parent still has the child for the majority of
the time, and that the weekends may be the most convenient time
for the child to spend with the noncustodial parent. The child's
interests are best met when the child is able to spend enough time
195. See COMMITTEE, supra note 46, at 80; see also MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 1,
at 3.
196. See In re Marriage of Jarman, 752 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) ("While the
stability of the environment is a valid consideration in awarding custody, instability alone
is not sufficient to support a restriction on visitation.") (citation omitted).
197. See HODGES, supra note 40, at 147.
Attempts on the part of parents to alter patterns of visitations based on the
quality of bonding or needs of the child were met by strong resistance....
Attorneys (and judges) have been excessively influenced by case law, where the
past determines the future. Thus, every other weekend is the best pattern
because there is ample precedence [sic], that is, "that is the way it has always
been done."
Id.
198. See MARGARET JASPER, THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY 11-14 (1997); see also WATNIK,
supra note 112, at 91-94 (suggesting alternatives to the every-other-weekend model).
199. See HODGES, supra note 40, at 171 ("One trouble with 'frequent and liberal' visitation
without specifying the pattern of visitation is that visitation is often set with the needs of the
parents in mind rather than the needs of the child.').
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with the noncustodial parent, in order to develop a significant
parent-child relationship. 00
Thus, the law implements a visitation determination that
receives much less analysis than the custody determination does.
This determination most often results in the every-other-weekend
pattern and because this pattern has weak justifications, it
deserves to be replaced.
VI. A PROPOSED STANDARD
Clearly, given the need for children to maintain strong
relationships with their noncustodial parents, the current visitation
standards are substandard. A better means exists to ensure that
children of divorce can survive the stresses and effects of divorce
without missing the beneficial effects of having both parents in
their lives. This section will discuss the reasons why the current
visitation standards have failed, why the visitation standard should
have its own separate analysis, and will also propose a new
visitation standard.
A. Why the Current Visitation Standards Have Failed
The current visitation standards have failed for several
reasons. First, they fail to protect the children's rights of access to
their noncustodial parents and the parents' rights of access to their
children. Second, they fail to satisfy the children of divorce's needs
to maintain a strong relationship with their noncustodial parents.
Third, they fail to provide clear guidance for decision-makers.
Finally, they fail to clarify what visitation the decision-makers will
order and enforce.
The current visitation standards fail to protect the children's
rights of access to their noncustodial parents because the standards
do not adequately provide for an analysis of the family situation.
The courts should consider the entire family situation to ensure
that the child has full access to the parenting, nurturing, and care-
taking that each parent can provide. Currently, few statutes
explicitly provide for an analysis of the various factors and circum-
stances surrounding the parents and child.2 ' Fewer still reflect
any legislative intent to help provide the child access to both
200. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
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parents." 2 In addition, the current visitation standards do not
adequately protect the noncustodial parent's right of access to her
child. While the focus of the custody standards revolve around.the
best interests of the child, not parental rights, the focus of the
visitation standards continue to remain undefined; therefore, a
noncustodial parent's right of access to her child still requires a
certain amount of safeguarding.
The current visitation standards fail to satisfy the need for
children of divorce to maintain strong relationships with their
noncustodial parents. The standards do not sufficiently analyze the
family situation in order to determine how the amount of time
spent with each other will adequately allow both the child and the
noncustodial parent to promote and maintain a necessary, strong
relationship," 3 in order to prevent the potential negative conse-
quences of the unique stresses that children of divorce face.
The current visitation standards also fail to provide clear gui-
dance for decision-makers because they fail to explicitly set forth a
defined standard accompanied by guidelines for meeting that
standard. The majority of visitation standards are either subsumed
into the custody determination or exist in a separate, weak, vague
form. Moreover, the visitation provisions do not provide a clearly
defined and easy-to-follow standard, so they are little help to deci-
sion-makers. As such, the decision-makers make a determination
that is either almost totally based upon their discretion, or as more
often happens, they resort to the every-other-weekend pattern.
As the current visitation standards fail to provide clear
guidance to the decision-maker, they also fail to provide a clear
understanding of what the decision-maker will order should the
parents be unable to agree upon or negotiate the visitation. The
parents usually have even less of an understanding of what the
children need than do the decision-makers, and can be at a loss
when trying to understand what process should govern for deter-
mining custody and visitation. As a result, nothing mitigates a
party's tendency to viciously litigate both custody and visitation
determinations.
The failings of the current visitation standards may have
undesirable effects. They may lead to a lack of a strong relationship
between the child and the noncustodial parent, frustration and/or
alienation of the noncustodial parent, and a belief on the part of the
202. See id.
203. See supra notes 154-200 and accompanying text.
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custodial parent that she, and not the actual decision-maker, is in
charge of determining what time the child should spend with the
noncustodial parent.2°4 Lack of a strong relationship between the
child and the noncustodial parent can lead to all of the harmful
effects described earlier.2"5 The non-custodial parent's frustration
or alienation can also lead to a lack of a strong relationship between
the child and the noncustodial parent, as well as to the nonpayment
of financial support obligations. Vague visitation provisions
essentially allow the custodial parent to dictate visitation, reinforc-
ing the custodial parent's belief that the custodial parent is in
charge of visitation." 8 These efforts can be devastating to both the
child and to the noncustodial parent, resulting in repeated visita-
tion interference, the child's low self-esteem, and recurrent
litigation.2 °7
B. Why Visitation Should Have Its Own Separate Analysis
I propose that visitation should receive its own separate
analysis, distinct from a custody determination, with a clearly
defined and easy-to-follow standard, as well as specific guidelines
for the decision-maker to consider. Unlike the custodial relation-
ship, the relationship between the child and the noncustodial
parent is more attenuated and intermittent. Thus, the noncustodial
parent's relationship with the child has a potentially weaker effect
on the child. Moreover, the lack of time the noncustodial parent
spends with the child undermines a strong relationship between the
child and the noncustodial parent, which has potentially negative
effects upon the child. Visitation needs to be determined through
an analysis that takes into account all of the concerns previously
discussed so that the appropriate amount of time is accorded for the
relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent to
develop.
C. The Proposed Standard
The proposed visitation standard should consist of several
elements: a declaration of legislative intent; a standard for
204. See generally OAKLAND, supra note 107 (discussing traditional custody arrange-
ments).
205. See supra notes 12-45 and accompanying text.
206. See OAKLAND, supra note 107, at 153.
207. See generally Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 18 (exploring issues of joint
custody after divorce).
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determination; a set of guidelines detailing factors to consider in
meeting that standard; and provisions for terms and conditions to
facilitate the visitation. My analysis focuses on how to best meet
the needs of the children of divorce, which means that it focuses on
how best to preserve, promote, and maintain the relationship
between the child and the noncustodial parent, thereby maintaining
the child's mental and emotional health.
1. Declaration of Legislative Intent
In order to keep the parties and the decision-maker focused on
the purpose of the visitation, a declaration of legislative intent
would be an essential part of the visitation standard. The declara-
tion should state that the intent of the visitation standard is to
ensure that children have a meaningful relationship with both
parents after a separation or after a dissolution of the marriage, as
well as to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities
of raising the children. It would also ensure that the parents
understand that they are both still parents, with the rights and
responsibilities of parents, and that the law recognizes and protects
equally the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent.
2. The Standard for Determination
The same standard should be used for both visitation and
custody determinations: the best interests of the child. This
standard places the focus on the rights and interests of the child,
not the noncustodial parent. Hence, it provides the proper context
for the determination, i.e. what this child needs in order to grow up
healthy and well adjusted, rather than focusing on the noncustodial
parent's rights to see the child. Although the noncustodial parent's
rights are important and should not be infringed, the parties to the
action are more likely to remain objective and limit their emotional
responses when the focus is on the good of the child. The primary
concern is not the noncustodial parent's adjustment to the changed
family structure, but rather the child's development and well being.
Into this context, a greater chance exists that, when determining
how much time the child will spend with the noncustodial parent,
the noncustodial parent will also obtain the visitation she wants.
How should the best interests of the child be defined? Barring
abuse or other negative factors which would be grounds for limiting
or denying visitation, and assuming two reasonably fit parents, the
best interests of the child clearly dictate that the child have the
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opportunity for a strong meaningful relationship with the non-
custodial parent. The standard should thereby preserve, promote,
and protect the relationship between the child and the noncustodial
parent.
3. The Guidelines for Determination
Guidelines must also be developed to use when determining
how to meet the best interests of the child. The guidelines should
direct the decision-maker to consider certain factors and circum-
stances surrounding the parents and child. The Ohio statute
2 0 8
provides a large list of factors to take into consideration. That
statute provides a basis for the following factors:
1. The prior interaction and interrelationships of the child
with the child's parents, siblings, and other related
persons;
2. The geographical location of the residence of each parent
and the distance between those residences;
3. The child's and parents' available time, including, but not
limited to, each parent's employment schedule, the child's
school schedule, and the child's and parents' holiday and
vacation schedule;
4. The age of the child;
5. The child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
6. The wishes and concerns of the child;
7. The health and safety of the child;
8. The amount of time that will be available for the child to
spend with siblings;
9. The mental and physical health of all parties;
10. Each parent's willingness to reschedule missed visitation
and to facilitate the other parent's visitation rights;
11. Whether either parent has been convicted of crimes related
to child abuse;
12. Whether the custodial parent has continuously and
willfully denied the noncustodial parent's right to visita-
tion;
13. Any other factor in the best interests of the child.
Taking these factors into consideration should allow the
decision-maker to account for all of the circumstances in the
environment surrounding the parents and the child.
208. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(D) (West Supp. 1998).
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4. Terminology
As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, the term "visita-
tion" is laden with legal and emotional baggage. In order to dispel
the stigma of characterizing the time spent between the parent and
the child as a mere visit, a new term should be used. An example
would be the term "parenting time," used in the Michigan statute.2 9
"Parenting time" characterizes the time spent between the parent
and the child as an opportunity for the parent to continue in her
role and function as parent to her child, a right to which the parent
is entitled. "Parenting time" also recognizes the child's entitlement
to spend time with her noncustodial parent. Use of this new term
will hopefully begin to destroy the perception that the noncustodial
parent has a secondary quality and importance to the custodial
parent.
5. Terms and Conditions to Facilitate Parenting Time
Defining the terms and conditions under which parenting time
shall take place eliminates confusion and ambiguity. It also serves
to reduce potential points of contention between the parents. The
Michigan statute takes the approach that the visitation order "may
contain any reasonable terms or conditions that facilitate the
orderly and meaningful exercise of parenting time by a parent."
210
The visitation standard should be analogous to the Michigan
standard, in order to avoid misunderstanding or conflict. Similar
to the Michigan statute, the standard should also provide for any
reasonable terms or conditions that become necessary to facilitate
the orderly and meaningful exercise of parenting time by the
noncustodial parent, to include but not limited to the following:
1. Division of the responsibility to transport the child;
2. Division of the cost of transporting the child;
3. Restrictions on the presence of third persons during
parenting time or at the pickup and return of the child;
4. Requirements that the child be ready for parenting time at
a specific time;
5. Requirements that the parent arrive for parenting time
and return the child from parenting time at specific times;
209. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27 (West 1998).
210. Id.
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6. Requirements that parenting time occur in the presence of
a third person or agency when necessary;
7. Requirements of reasonable notice when parenting time
will not occur; and
8. Any other reasonable condition determined to be appropri-
ate in the particular case.
6. Summary
Thus, the proposed visitation standard preserves, promotes,
and protects the relationship between the child and the
noncustodial parent in accordance with the best interests of the
child standard, which dictates a strong continuing relationship. It
includes a declaration of legislative intent to grant parenting time
in a frequency, duration, and type calculated to promote a strong
relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent.
Further, it determines parenting time by considering several listed
factors and provides for determining reasonable terms and condi-
tions to facilitate parenting time. This standard should provide
enough flexibility to adequately determine visitation for any
situation. While this proposed visitation standard seems extremely
similar to custody determination standards, and would thus seem
to be redundant in cases where the "Custody" determination
includes both primary physical custody and visitation, the danger
still exists that the visitation might be subsumed into the custody
determination and therefore neglected.
This visitation standard, as with custody determinations,
should be applied on a case-by-case basis. It should not express
what amount or type of visitation is appropriate for certain ages or
circumstances because not all family situations are alike, not all
children are identical, nor do all children develop at the same rate.
I reject the Texas approach of making statutory determinations
about visitation in all cases because of its inherent inflexibility.
211
211. The Texas Family Code provides for specific times of possession of the child by the
noncustodial parent (termed "possessory conservator"). For example, for a noncustodial
parent who lives less than 100 miles from the primary residence of the child, the law defines
which weekends of the month that parent shall have the child (first, third, and fifth
weekends), how long those weekends shall last (from 6:00 p.m. Friday until 6:00 p.m. the
following Sunday), when they would have the child during spring vacations from school (in
even-numbered years from 6:00 p.m. on the day the child is dismissed from school until 6:00
p.m. on the day before school resumes after that vacation), and so forth. See TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.312 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
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Flexibility is vital to visitation standards because' of the need to
account for different situations and circumstances.212
This proposed visitation standard should adequately preserve,
promote, and protect the relationship between the child and the
noncustodial parent so that the child's well being, development, and
health are maximized. It ensures that the visitation ordered is the
result of careful thought and takes into account the entire situation
and all of the circumstances surrounding the child and parents.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current visitation system does not work as well as it
should. It generally places little or no emphasis on protecting the
relationship between children of divorce and their noncustodial
parents. In order to promote, preserve, and protect that relation-
ship, the system must employ a visitation standard that encom-
passes an analysis of the complete family situation. The proposed
visitation standard achieves this goal because it provides a
statement of the purpose for visitation; promotes, preserves, and
protects the relationship between the child and the noncustodial
parent; provides guidelines for the determination of visitation;
allows the decision-maker to set conditions to facilitate the
visitation; and applies in either sole or joint custody applications.
212. See WHEELER, supra note 100, at 58-59.
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APPENDIX A: STATES WITH No SEPARATE VISITATION PROVISIONS
(EITHER IT Is NOT MENTIONED OR "CUSTODY" INCLUDES
"CUSTODY" AND "VISITATION")
STATE ITERMS USED IHOW? IFACTORS VISITATION
GUEDANCE
"Custody" determination is assumed to include a determination of the
custodial parent and a provision for visitation.
AR C(v)
C(v)
(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
C(v)
BIC to ensure
frequent contact
BIC
BIC
BIC
BIC
BIC
BIC
BIC
None given
BIC
Most conducive to the
benefit of the child
BIC
BIC
Best interests and
welfare of the child
None given
BIC
No Later in the
statute
Yes No
Yes No
"Custody" and "visitation" are both mentioned, but are determined
together in the same "Custody" process.
AK C&V C: BIC
NC C & V Best interests &
welfare of the child
NE C & time spent BIC
NJ C & parenting
VA C&V
WI Legal custody
and physical
placement
WV C&V
C: BIC
C: BIC
BIC
No
Yes
Yes-time
spent with
each parent
Yes- pareninq
time
Yes
No
Primary caretaker No No
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"Custody" and "visitation" are equal parts of a determination of
"Parental Rights and Responsibilities."
ME Parental rights & BIC Yes No
responsibilities
VT Parental rights BIC Yes No
& responsibilities
"Custody" and "visitation" are equal parts of a determination of a
"Parenting Plan."
MT Parenting Plan BIC Yes No
WA Parenting Plan Several objectives Yes Parentin
time
Joint Custody
AL JC (unless SC) JC: BIC Yes Only in
the context
of SC
CT JC Silent No No
No standard given
NY No standard given
Legend:
BIC: Best Interests of the Child
C(v): "Custody" determination is assumed to include both physical
placement with the custodial parent and the visitation for
the noncustodial parent.
C & V: The terms "custody," meaning physical placement with the
custodial parent, and "visitation," meaning time spent with the
noncustodial parent, are both mentioned, but one "Custody"
determination will determine provisions for each.
JC: Joint Custody
SC: Sole Custody
Code provisions for the various states:
AL ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989 & Supp. 1997)
AK ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (Michie 1998)
AR ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1998)
CO COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1998)
CT CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1999)
FL FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997)
GA GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (Supp. 1998)
ID IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1996)
IN IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (Michie 1997)
KS KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp. 1997)
ME ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (West 1998)
MD MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-203 (Supp. 1998)
MA MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 1998)
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MS -MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1994 & Supp. 1998)
MT MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1998)
NE NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Supp. 1997)
NV NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480 (Michie 1998)
NH N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1992 & Supp. 1998)
NJ N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West Supp. 1998)
NM N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998)
NY N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 240 (Consol. Supp. 1998)
NC N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1995)
OR OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (Supp. 1999)
SC S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1998)
SD S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-4-45 (Michie Supp. 1998)
VT VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (1989 & Supp. 1998)
VA VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie Supp. 1998)
WA WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.184 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999)
WV W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1998)
WI WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 1998)
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APPENDIX B: STATES WITH SEPARATE VISITATION PROVISIONS
State Standard or factors used
Visitation, Reasonable Visitation, Liberal Visitation
CA Reasonable visitation rights
HI Reasonable visitation
IA Liberal visitation where appropriate
IL Reasonable visitation rights
KY Reasonable visitation rights
LA Reasonable visitation rights
MO Reasonable visitation rights
OK Visitation
RI Reasonable right of visitation
WY Visitation
Best Interests of the Child Standard
DE A schedule of visitation with the other parent,
consistent with the child's best interests and
maturity.
UT In determining visitation rights... the court
shall consider the best interests of the child.
Maintenance of the Parent-Child Relationship Between the Child and the
Noncustodial Parent
AZ Reasonable visitation rights to ensure that the minor child has
frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent.
MN Rights of visitation on behalf of the child and noncustodial
parent as will enable the child and noncustodial parent to
maintain a parent-child relationship that will be in the best
interests of the child.
ND Such rights of visitation as will enable the child and non-
custodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship that
will be beneficial to the child.
TN Such rights of visitation as will enable the child and non-
custodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship.
Maintenance of the Parent-Child Relationship Between the Child
and Both Parents
MI Reasonable parenting time, which is further defined as being
granted in accordance with the best interests of the child. It is
presumed to be in the best interests of the child for the child to
have a strong relationship with both parents .... [Plarenting
time shall be granted to a parent in a frequency, duration, type
reasonably calculated to promote a strong relationship between
the child and the parent granted parenting time.
OH A just and reasonable order or decree permitting [the non-
custodial parent] to visit the child at the time and under the
conditions that the court directs .... Whenever possible, the
order or decree permitting the visitation shall ensure the
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opportunity for both parents to have frequent and continuing
contact with the child.
Any Factors Affecting the Child
PA Any factor which legitimately impacts the child's physical,
intellectual, or emotional well-being.
Statutory Standardized Visitation Provisions
TX Terms of standard possessory order as given in the statute.
Code provisions for the various states:
AZ ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337 (West Supp. 1998)
CA CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100 (West Supp. 1999)
DE DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728 (Supp. 1998)
HI HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (Michie Supp. 1997)
IL 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West Supp. 1998)
IA IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1998)
KY Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320 (Michie Supp. 1998)
LA LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136 (West Supp. 1999)
MI MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.27 (West Supp. 1998)
MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (West Supp. 1999)
MO Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.400 (West 1997)
ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1997)
OH OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (West Supp. 1998)
OK OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West Supp. 1999)
PA 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West Supp. 1998)
RI R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-9 (1996 & Supp. 1998)
TN TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (Supp. 1998)
TX TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.311 through 153.317
(West 1996 & Supp. 1999)
UT UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1998)
WV W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1998)
WY Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113 (Michie 1997)
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